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Abstract
This study concentrates on the analysis of the characteristics of the
ownership and business links existing between the enterprises; the
effects of business links and financial discipline on the effectiveness
and growth capability of enterprises, as well as the changes which
have taken place since 1992 in the performance of Hungarian
enterprises. The author regard financial discipline (the breach of
payment obligations toward the partners or in the delayed payment
of taxes) a very important indicator in that how safe the business
links of a company can be considered. The results show that the
occurrence of liquidity problems in itself has a significant effect on
the breach of financial discipline. The absence of firm’s growth
increases the chance for breach of financial discipline and the
foreign-owned companies are better protected against the looser
payment discipline of the partners. The results also confirm the
better growth capability of foreign companies. If companies which
are related by ownership links also establish business links, then the
closer business links make better growth dynamics probable.
Companies, which are each others' suppliers within a company
group usually, achieve a faster growth than the rest of the
companies. The analysis of tax returns shows that we are not
talking simply of the temporary good influence of the transition from
state-ownership to private ownership but we can emphasize a
certain type of private ownership, that is, foreign ownership, which
significantly improves the performance of the companies. According
to the results, the contributions to the value added do not show a
positive effect of privatization. The better performance of privatized
(between 1993–1996) companies measured by the value added to
employment in 1996 is not the result of privatization, but other
technological, organizational influences or business conditions,
which were in effect even before privatization.
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Összefoglaló
Az alábbi elemzés a vállalatok közötti piaci és tulajdonosi kapcsola-
tok jellemzõivel, az üzleti kapcsolatoknak és a pénzügyi fegyelem-nek
a vállalatok hatékonyságára és növekedési képességére gyako-rolt
hatásaival, és a magyar vállalatok hatékonyságban 1992 óta be-
következett változásokkal foglalkozik. A szerzõ a cégek pénzügyi fe-
gyelmét (ami magában foglalja a szállítókkal szembeni fizetési fe-
gyelmet és az adófizetési fegyelmet is) az üzleti kapcsolatok bizton-
ságát jelzõ nagyon fontos indikátornak tekinti. Az elemzés eredmé-
nyei azt mutatják, hogy a likviditási problémák elõfordulása önma-
gában számottevõ hatással van arra, hogy a cég megsértse a pénz-
ügyi fegyelmet. Ha a cég nem képes növekedni, akkor ez is növeli a
pénzügyi fegyelem megsértésének esélyét; továbbá az is látszik, hogy
a többségében külföldi tulajdonban lévõ cégek jobban védve
vannak a pénzügyi fegyelmet megszegõ üzleti partnerek által okozott
veszte-ségektõl. Az eredmények alátámasztják továbbá azt, hogy a
többi cégnél jobbak a külföldi tulajdonban lévõ cégek növekedési
esélyei. Ha egy cégnek, amelyet tulajdonosi kapcsolatok kötnek egy
cégcso-porthoz, szoros üzleti kapcsolatai vannak a cégcsoporton
belül, ak-kor ez is erõteljesebb növekedési képességet valószínûsít.
Azok a cé-gek, amelyek egymás beszállítói egy cégcsoporton belül,
gyorsabban tudnak növekedni, mint a többi cég. Az adóbevallások
elemzése arra mutat, hogy nem pontos, ha az állami tulajdonból a
magántulajdon-ba való átmenet rövidtávú pozitív hatásairól
beszélünk, mivel ebben a folyamatban a magántulajdon egy
meghatározott típusa, a külföldi tulajdon játszott meghatározó
szerepet és javította szignifikánsan a cégek eredményességét. Az
eredmények szerint a privatizáció nem javította a vállalatoknak a
hozzáadott értékhez való hozzájárulását. Az egy foglalkoztatottra
jutó hozzáadott értékben mért eredményes-ség az 1993–1996 között
privatizált cégek esetében nem a privatizá-ció eredményeként volt
jobb 1996-ban, hanem vélhetõen olyan technológiai vagy szervezeti
hatások, üzleti feltételek miatt, amelyek már a privatizáció elõtt is
kifejtették hatásukat.
3INTRODUCTION
In the following study we shall summarize the results of researches which
analyze the transformation of the Hungarian economy from the viewpoint
of Hungarian enterprises and aims to assess and understand processes
taking place at the enterprises' level.
Economical transformation means not only radical changes in the system
of governmental institutions, in the legal circumstances, ownership
structures and macro-economical conditions of the economy, but it also
means extensive changes within the entrepreneurial sector in relation to
the business links between the enterprises and their performance.
This study concentrates on the analysis of the latter factors by trying to
disclose the characteristics of the ownership and business links existing
between the enterprises. Then it examines the effect that business links
have on the effectiveness and growth capability enterprises, as well as the
changes which have taken place since 1992 in the economical
circumstances and performance of Hungarian enterprises.
These changes, in our opinion, can be shown not only through indicators
formulated on the basis of the real data of enterprises (net turnover, value
added, cash flow) but also by those which indicate the enterprises'
behavior and are harder to express in numbers. Among these are the
financial discipline of the firms, the need to form stable business links,
or the period for which the firms is able to make business plans. The
observation of these, which can be done through surveys, provides a
chance for us not only to analyze the indicators showing the economic
circumstances and effectiveness of the companies, but we can also have
a glimpse at the conditions which influence the business decisions of the
management.
The first part of the study deals with the more important tendencies
characterizing the transformation of the Hungarian companies. In the
second part we shall discuss the role of the ownership links between the
enterprises. We shall deal with the commissioning of subcontractors and
with the role of each type of suppliers and customers within the turnover.
In the second part we also analyze the relationship between the safety of
business links, the financial discipline and the growth capability of the
companies. We will also discuss the change which has taken place in the
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the factors influencing the growth capability of companies which is one
of the most important questions related to the transformation of the
companies.
In the fourth part we will analyze the changes which have taken place in
the performance of the companies belonging to the various groups. We
will deal with the possible effects of the ownership structure separately.
The performance of the companies will be measured by the value added
and the absolute value of the cash flow and their percentage as to the
assets and employee number of the firms. Finally, in the fourth part we
shall summarize the most important results of the study.
In our work we used several sources. Among these the most important is
the data set which included the tax returns of Hungarian companies
operating in manufacturing, construction and trade between 1992–1996
(TAX92-96) and surveys carried out using questionnaires, which included
the largest exporting manufacturing companies as well as a representative
sample of manufacturing companies (TOP98/1 and CIPE98A). (For the
more detailed description of data sources see Appendices 1-3).
1.  STRUCTURAL CHANGES AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE
During the transformation of the Hungarian economy which can be
observed at micro level we can see not only the radical transformation of
the inner structure and market orientation of the enterprises (Laki [1994],
Estrin et al. [1995] Czakó [1997]), but also the formation of new
enterprises and the reorganization of business and ownership links
between enterprises already in operation. Statistical data on the
distribution of Hungarian firms by size confirm that the structure of
Hungarian industrial companies has also transformed since the change of
the political system and the so-called "reversed pyramid" has disappeared
(see Tables 1.1 and 1.2). The establishment of enterprises from the
former state-owned companies and their appearance in the market (Móra
[1991]), as well as the foundation of new private enterprises supported
this process (Kornai [1990], Laky [1998]).
In accordance to this, the transformation of the companies is primarily
characterized by the significant increase in the number of economic
5actors (see Table 1.3). Above all, the number of limited liability
companies with legal entities increased. Their number increased threefold
between 1992 and 1997. This was followed by the rapid increase in the
number of joint-stock companies, their number doubled in that period.
On the other hand, as a result of privatization, the disappearance of state-
owned enterprises and the significant decrease in the importance of
cooperatives characterized this period.
The number of sole proprietors increased considerably between 1992-
1995 but, as a result of the introduction of the so-called ‘action package’
of Mr. Bokros, Minister of Finances, this was followed by a significant
decrease. This decrease, however, is illusory. This can be verified by
considering the number of actually operating enterprises (those submitting
tax returns), not all those which are registered. According to this, instead
of decreasing, the number of sole proprietors in operation increased
between 1995–97. Accordingly, the decrease, which can be seen in Table
1.3, is the result of the fact that a large number of sole proprietors
announced the liquidation of their only formally existing enterprises.
Thus, the numbers reflecting the ‘de jure’ situation moved closer to
indicators showing the ‘de facto’ situation. The slight increase of the
number of sole proprietors in operation only confirmed this bizarre
situation where every tenth member of the active population in Hungary is
a sole proprietor or every seventh or tenth person is either a sole
proprietor or the member of some kind of joint enterprise.
These facts, however, do not mean the strength of “sole proprietors” or
their weight in the Hungarian economy. All it means is that a significant
part of former employees have become self-employed and they are
registered as “sole proprietors” in the records of the Hungarian tax and
statistical systems. These sole proprietors almost always work alone or
include members of their families; during their activities they do not
distinguish between the enterprise and the household, and their aim is not
growth but to provide for the family (Laky [1998]). Thus, the high
percentage of self-employment is not a sign of the advanced state of the
economy but, on the contrary, of the lower state of development (OECD
[1996]).
Another characteristic of the period between 1992-1996 is that the
decrease and then the slight increase of the GDP in 1994-1996 effected
the various sectors of the economy differently. While the GDP produced
by the manufacturing industry increased by 5-8% per year between 1993–
61996, there was a continuous decrease in trade (see Table 1.4)1.
The third characteristic is that during the sharp increase in the number of
enterprises, the transformational recession and the transformation of the
size structure of the economy, the turnover always remained strongly
concentrated. This is supported by the fact that the proportion of
enterprises with over 20 employees in manufacturing, construction and
trade did not increase significantly during that period and, on the other
hand, by the fact that the concentration of the net turnover of these
companies did not change. We can obtain this result if we calculate for
every year the percentage of the turnover for one-tenth of each of the
various size companies (see Table 1.5).
It is obvious to everyone that the 90’s brought profound changes in the
ownership structure of the economy. However, it is the subject of dispute
among Hungarian economists and researchers dealing with the ownership
structure of the economy what kind of ownership structures developed
following the privatization. In our opinion, at the end of the 90’s the
Hungarian companies’ ownership structures can be characterized by three
factors:
· domination of foreign and Hungarian private ownership
· formation of concentrated, and
· rigid ownership structures.
Following the privatization of state properties in Hungary ownership
structures formed among the large manufacturing companies and we can
say that, with the exception of about 50 companies on the stock-market
and the OTC, about four-fifth of the firms are owned by three owners
and in about 81% of the companies one owner has the majority (above
50%) of shares (see Table 1.6). As a result of this, in most of the larger
Hungarian companies the management would have limited power to
enforce ideas or intentions, which are different from the owners'. We
must add, however, that in almost half of the large manufacturing
companies (48,1%), the members of the management or the employees
                                                
1 We must add that unregistered trade must be added to the officially registered GDP of
trade. In the household expenses in 1996 the proportion of unregistered expenses was
estimated to be 9-12% in the case of food, 12-15% in the case of beverages and
tobacco, 25-32% for clothing and 4-5% in the case of other goods (Tóth [1997–98a).
7are directly present as owners. And where they are present their average
ratio of ownership is over 50%. On the other hand, here we should take
into consideration cases where the managers are not owners directly but
through their own companies or company groups2.
These data call our attention to the fact that among the owners of large
Hungarian manufacturing companies the role of the managers is not
insignificant in 1995 (behind the scattered employee ownership we can
presume the strong position of the management). That is, by 1995 in
Hungary we can say that not only are the supervisory rights centered in
the hands of the management, but they are also assuming responsibi-lities
as owners. These results, while confirming the importance of the role of
managers, also question the relevance of statements concerning diffusive
ownership and the absence of private property3.
On the other hand, it is the concentrated ownership structure and within
this the decisive role of the management which explain the assumption
that in a significant part of the Hungarian economy, ownership positions
formulated at the beginning of the 90's may become consolidated. The
relative underdevelopment of the capital market also confirms that the
obtained ownership positions will stay effective for a long time.
2. OWNERSHIP LINKS, BUSINESS NETWORKS AND GROWTH
CAPABILITY
2.1.   Ownership and business links
Among the 300 companies included in the TOP98/1 survey ownership
links can be considered to be widespread. 61% of the companies are
                                                
2 The source of the data is the survey entitled "Company Management in Central Europe"
which was carried out in 1995 by the Privatization Project of the Central European
University and the World Bank and which included the data of 255 enterprises  where the
number of employees was between 100-2000 heads in December 1994. Within the
framework of the related OTKA research (T 013497) we investigated the ownership
structures of the companies in question, as well as changes in their ownership which have
taken place since their foundation or formation. The case studies supplied several
examples where the management's share of ownership in the companies they managed
were insignificant, while they had a decisive influence as owners through companies they
owned.
3 See the relevant statements of the theory of post-communist manager-capitalism
(Szelényi et al. [1996]).
8owned partly by some companies (located in Hungary or abroad) and
27% of them own some other Hungarian firms. We get lower ratios if we
only consider the domestic firms as owners: 33% of the largest exporters
are partly owned by domestic firms. If we take into consideration both
the ownership links which are directed to and from the firms, then we can
say that 71% of the companies (n=212) possess such links. If we only
look at links with Hungarian companies, the ratio of companies with
ownership links is a lot lower (47%). This ratio means a 4 percent
decrease as compared to 1996 (see Table 2.1).
We asked companies with ownership links whether the enterprises which
belong to the company group play a role in the purchases and sales of the
given company (and if so, how important are their roles). According to
the results, in the case of more than two-thirds of the companies there are
not only ownership relations but also business links. If we look at the
strength of business links within the sample of those with ownership
links, we can see that these are significantly diffused. We frequently come
across cases when there are no links between companies within the
company group, or they may exist at a very low level, or there are
relatively strong links (see Figure 2.1).
On the basis of the calculations we can categorize the companies into
four groups:
· there are no business links between the company examined
and the other members of the company group (32%);
· the ratio of such business links is minimal (20% at the
most) (31% of the companies belong to this group);
· the ratio is over 20% but does not exceed 80% (32%);
· and finally, where most of the sales and 80% of the
purchases take place within the company group (6%).
According to this, the exclusiveness of business links within the company
group is only valid for an insignificant part of the manufacturing
companies and cannot be considered as a widespread phenomenon as
we can only state for 15% of them that business links within the holding
exceed half of the turnover of the company examined.
It is more than usual in the case of larger companies that they have
ownership links (Tóth [1997-98b]) and more of those which are in the
possession of private companies own other Hungarian companies. The
9situation is different in the case of firms with foreign ownership. Here we
can see a phenomenon, which is, characteristic of developed countries:
companies with foreign ownership are ceteris paribus less frequently and
not as strongly related to the network of the national companies of the
given country (Stokman et. al [1985]).
51% of the companies with less than 50 employees have enterprises
among their owners, while this occurs in 80% of those with over 500
employees. Domestic firms are co-owners in about 20% of the foreign-
owned companies (its ratio is 33% in the whole sample) and the ratio of
foreign-owned companies which have shares in other companies is also
lower than what is characteristic of the whole sample (21% as compared
to 27%).
Among enterprises with majority foreign ownership it is more than usual
that there are strong business links within the company group than in the
case of firms dominated by other types of owners (see Table 2.2).
Where the average ratio of purchases and sales within the company group
was over 80% the majority owners of all firms were foreign companies,
while in 57% of them this ratio was between 20-80%. In the case of
companies owned by Hungarian individuals and domestic firms the
situation is just the opposite: for them being part of a company group
does not necessarily mean business links as well. If a company is owned
by Hungarian individuals, then usually there are no business links between
them and the other members of the company group, while if the foreign
ownership dominates, there generally are such links (see Table 2.3).
On the basis of the results we cannot say that there are strong ownership
and business links between the large Hungarian enterprises. If we take
into consideration the intensity of business relationships, we can see that
it is usually characteristic of those companies which are the least
interested in possessing Hungarian firms or have Hungarian firms among
their owners to have strong business relationships as well as ownership
links (foreign-owned). Furthermore, it can be stated that, among
Hungarian companies which are related by ownership links, the intensity
of business relations is less, that is, in case of a holding structure the
members of the holding depend less on each other in their purchases than
it was presumed earlier. So, our empirical data do not support the famous
Stark's recombinant property theory (Stark [1996]). We assume that this
overestimates the frequency, strength and the role of inter-enterprise
network in the Hungarian economy and misinterprets the characteristics
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of enterprise transformation in the transforming economies.
The data shows that 69% of the largest exporting companies
commissioned subcontractors regularly in 1997. The commissioning of
subcontractors is characteristic of all companies and foreign-owned
companies use it just as much as Hungarian private firms. One of the
usual ways of minimizing expenses related to salaries is to dismiss the
employees and then commission the enterprises founded by those who
had been dismissed. This phenomenon, however, is not frequent among
the largest exporters (10,7%).
According to the calculations there is a positive relationship between the
establishment of business links within the company group and the
commissioning of dismissed employees as subcontractors. Both supply
information on the affinity towards changing the boundaries of the given
firm. In the first case the establishment of the company group and within
this the forming of business links extends the real boundaries of the
company beyond the formal (legal) boundaries. And in the second case,
by discontinuing activities formerly carried out at the company and
buying them from a formally separate enterprise the formal boundaries of
the company can be narrowed down without leaving its real boundaries
unchanged.
2.2.   Business links, financial discipline and competitors
Time horizon of planning
The stability or instability of the market conditions of firms is well
characterized by how far ahead the company management can plan the
business conditions of the firm. According to the results of the survey
regarding this there has been an improvement in this tendency since 1994.
Among manufacturing companies, which had the largest export in 1995,
and in 1997 more companies were able to plan for a longer period as
compared to 1994. The proportion of those who planned for at least
three years was close to 41% in 1994, while it was 57% in 1995 and 1997
(see Figure 2.2).
The reason why the years should be compared is that the then most
significant exporting companies were surveyed. According to this, the
increase of the time horizon of planning and the stabilization of the
business situation of the largest exporters can take place at company level
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(if a company was included in all three years' samples) or through the
change of the composition of the samples between 1994 and 1997. That
is, with the increase in the ratio of companies with more stable business
conditions the set of large exporters had changed. We must take into
consideration that in the examined three years an in-depth transformation
took place in the ownership relations of these companies. The decrease
of state property and the increase of Hungarian private property (see
Figure A3.1) characterized this transformation. This in itself resulted in
changes in the organization of enterprises and in the improvement of the
conditions of their sales which made long-term business calculations
possible.
Among the largest exporters the larger companies can plan for longer
periods. In 1997 approximately 83% of the companies which employed
more than 500 people were able to plan ahead for at least three years.
There is a significant increase in the time horizon of planning in the case
of foreign-owned companies which play a decisive role in the exports of
the manufacturing industry: in 1994 and 1995 only 46% of them planned
ahead for at least three years while in 1997, 60.7% of them.
Suppliers and buyers
The business conditions of companies are also characterized by what
kind business links they have, what companies they usually buy from and
what companies they sell to. According to this, we can examine these
linkages from two sides, from the side of suppliers and that of the
buyers. During the analysis we deal with four types of suppliers or buyers
(multinational companies, foreign companies, companies larger than the
companies examined, and companies smaller than the compa-nies
examined) which we defined according to the following logic:
1. multinational companies
2. not multinational companies
2.1 foreign companies
2.2 domestic companies
2.2.1 domestic companies, larger than the firm examined
2.2.2 domestic companies, smaller than the firm examined
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The roles these groups have in the purchases and sales can be seen in
Table 2.4. In the group of the largest exporters it is natural that in the
sales the multinational and foreign companies have the most important
roles. It can be considered a positive sign that in the purchases4.
Hungarian companies had a significant part, too. Although in the
purchases of the largest exporters Hungarian companies have a higher
than 50% ratio in only 13–16% of the cases, in the case of more than half
of the companies at least 20% of all purchases are materials, semi-
finished products and services bought from Hungarian firms.
Furthermore, we have examined whether among the largest exporters
there are significant differences in the sources of purchases and the
direction of sales. By sectors there are none, but by company size and
type of ownership we can observe the following:
· Smaller companies (with less than 50 employees) usually
do not purchase from companies smaller than they are (in
36% there is no trade between them, while an average 14%
of the companies do not purchase from smaller
companies);
· In the case of medium-size and large companies (more
than 200 employees) the sales of smaller domestic firms
are more significant than the average.
· On the other hand it can be stated that in the purchases of
companies with less than 50 employees the role of foreign
companies is less than average (35% of them do not buy
from foreign companies).
· A significant positive relationship can be reported between
the size of companies and the part foreign companies have
in purchases (Gamma=0,2143).
· The third statement is related to the relationship between
the owners of the largest exporters and their part in the
purchases of foreign companies. More foreign-owned
companies purchase from companies located abroad than
any others (in the purchases of 73% of them the ratio of
companies located abroad is more than 50%, while in the
sample this is only valid for 16% of the companies);
                                                
4 When approximating the distribution of the inputs we asked the managers not to take into
consideration the purchased energies.
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· firms owned by individuals purchase less than the average
from the former (in the purchases of 48% of them
foreigners have no part at all, while in the sample this ratio
is 21%).
Financial discipline
We regard financial discipline a very important indicator in that how safe
the business links of a company can be considered; how often the
examined companies have short-term liquidity problems which results in
the breach of payment obligations toward the partners (payment
discipline) or in the delayed payment of taxes (fiscal discipline). On the
other hand, from the change of behavior related to financial discipline we
can estimate not only the safety of contractual relationships but also how
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of companies representing the manufacturing companies as a whole.
The partners of almost 20% of the largest exporters do not delay with the
fulfillment of their payment obligations and in almost 40% of the cases at
least 20% of the partners regularly breach their obligations. We can also
state that the largest exporters are surrounded with somewhat more
dependable partners than most manufacturing companies (the partners of
25% of manufacturing firms breach of payment obligation and in almost
50% of the cases at lest 20% of the partners regularly breach these). So,
this phenomenon occurs less frequently among the largest exporters, but
if it does occur, than it is valid for a more limited circle of business
partners than what is usual in the case of manufacturing companies. This
confirms the fact that the financial discipline of the partners of smaller
companies is significantly worse than that of the larger ones (Tóth
[1998]).
Not only the partners, but the companies' financial discipline should also
be examined. In order to do this we asked the managers separately about
the breach of financial obligations toward the partners and the delayed
payment of taxes and various contributions. The results show that not
only is the financial discipline of the largest exporters' partners better than
it is usual in the case of manufacturing companies, but the largest
exporters themselves are more disciplined in this regard than the rest of
the manufacturing companies (see Figure 2.4). Furthermore, the
percentages characteristic of the largest exporters show that in this group
of companies both the breach of payment discipline and later the delay in
the payment of taxes are not insignificant. Liquidity problems occurred
frequently (in more than one-third of the samples) in 1997.
All these call our attention to the fact that companies which have a
decisive role in the output and growth of the manufacturing industry have
to count on the unstable payment discipline of their partners and these
companies do not always fulfill their payment or fiscal obligations. The
occurrence of short-term liquidity problems can be one of the most
important reasons for this. It is shown by the fact that if there is a breach
of the financial discipline it can be found in several areas at the same time.
It usually occurs in relation to the partners (delayed payments) and to the
government (delayed payment of taxes) and both phenomena are closely
related to the occurrence of liquidity problems (see Table 2.5). We can
also see that the instability observed with regard to the financial discipline
of the partners is closely related to the financial discipline of the
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company. Those who do not comply with financial disciplines can expect
that their partners will act the same way toward them (Tóth [1998]). If the
partners know that a company is in a "weak position" and has problems
fulfilling its payment obligations its partners will not pay or will delay their
payments to keep their money back5. But the causal relationship can be
reversed, too: a company can have financial difficulties because of the
late payments of its partners and because of this be forced to breach
payment discipline.
We compared the previously introduced indicators of financial discipline
with how close a company's business relationships are with multinational,
foreign and domestic companies. According to the results the breach of
financial discipline is less likely to occur in companies where the ratio of
purchases from multinational companies is higher (minimum 20%). On
the other hand, purchasing from larger Hungarian companies means that
breach of payment discipline is more likely to occur. The payment
discipline of the partners is best if the company has business links with
multinational or foreign companies. Links with larger Hungarian
companies definitely impairs the stability of a company's business links
as it means that more of the business partners breach payment
disciplines.
Finally, we were curious whether the type of ownership really effects the
financial discipline of a company and the behavior of the clients of
companies owned by the various owners differ from each other in this
area. Our previous researches confirmed that foreign-owned enterprises
are in a special situation: among them breach of payment discipline
occurs less frequently and the same is valid for their business partners
(Semjén–Tóth, [1997])6.
On the other hand, we expect that among enterprises with better growth
potential financial discipline will be more closely observed than in the
case of those which will be unable to grow or will grow slower. If this
factor has no influence then this also means that the breach of financial
discipline is a widespread phenomenon among the large exporters.
Besides indicating the absence of the ‘cleaning effect’ of the market, this
                                                
5  Kamilla Lányi called my attention to this phenomenon.
6 It is not worth to test the hypothesis regarding the worse payment discipline of state-owned
companies using the 1997 data as in the TOP98/1 sample we can only find 10 state-owned
companies.
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would also call the attention to the inner instability of companies, which
are able to grow.
We tested this assumptions using the logistic regression models the
dependent variables of which were supplied by the previously discussed
indicators of the financial discipline (fulfillment of payment obligations,
fiscal discipline, and the payment discipline of the business partners). In
every case we used the following:
Prob (FDISC = 1) = f (SECTOR2, L97O, FORE, DNT76O, RLIQUID)
Where
FDISC: indicator related to the breach of financial discipline, the
value of which is 1 – if it has happened 0 – if not;
SECTOR2: sectors
1 – food, tobacco, textile, wood, paper-making industries
2 – chemical industry, production of non-metallic mineral
products, metallurgy, and other manufacturing industries
3 – manufacture of machinery
L97O: staff categories (1 = –50 heads; 2 = 51–300 heads;
3 = 301– heads);
DNT76O: growth rate of turnover in 1997 (1 = decrease,
stagnation; 2 = growth rate less than the median;
3 = growth rate over the median);
FORE:1, if the majority owner is foreign, otherwise 0
RLIQUID: the residual of the model estimating the occurrence of
liquidity problems
(RLIQUID = LIQUID observed – LIQUID estimated).
The estimation was obtained using the following equation:
Prob (LIQUID = 1) = f (SECTOR2, L97O, FORE, DNT76O).
The reason for using the selected model is that the occurrence of liquidity
problems is closely related to the growth capability of 1997; that is,
growth capability effects financial discipline directly or through the
occurrence of liquidity problems (see Appendices 5 and 6). We would
like to examine the effect of growth capability and liquidity problems
separately so we divided the latter into two parts, the part determined by
growth capability and that, which is independent of it. Now the influence
of growth capability exerted through liquidity problems can be
considered as a direct effect of growth capability. The estimations of
liquidity problems are included in Appendix 6 and estimations regarding
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financial discipline can be seen in Table 2.6.
The results show that the occurrence of liquidity problems in itself has a
significant effect on the breach of financial discipline. It is obvious that in
the background there are certain influences which cannot be calculated on
during the analysis of the survey but which are responsible for causing
these problems.
The absence of growth in both models estimating the financial discipline
of the given company increases the chance for breach of financial
discipline. If, for example, in a company group where the growth rate of
turnover is above the median 30% of the members do not fulfill their
contractual obligations, the same can happen in 41% of those companies
which have the same characteristics but were unable to increase their
turnover in 1997. According to the estimations this ratio is about 47%
regarding the breach of fiscal discipline. Thus, we cannot confirm the
anxieties of those who question the more stable financial conditions of
companies which are capable of growth and are not convinced that there
is a positive relationship between a more energetic economic growth and
a more widespread compliance with market norms.
The quotient of probability for the breach of financial discipline is not the
same in the case of companies of various sizes, either. The probability
for breach of financial discipline increases if a company belongs to the
medium-size category (50–300 employees). We can also see that in both
cases foreign ownership is accompanied by a parameter less than one,
which means a decrease in the probability for breach of financial
discipline, but this influence is not significant. According to this, foreign
ownership does not play a distinguished role in this area and even if it
does have some influence it results in the better growth capabilities and
more stable liquidity conditions of the companies (see results shown in
Appendice 6).
In the third model of table 2.6 the foreign ownership had a significant
effect in relation to the occurrence of liquidity problems. First, the
occurrence of liquidity problems increases the probability that at least
20% of the company's partners do not fulfill their payment obligations.
Foreign-owned companies are ‘ceteris paribus’ better protected against
the looser payment discipline of the partners.
Competitors
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For the examination of the possible competitors of the companies we
used the categories described during the analysis of suppliers and buyers.
According to the results, the largest exporters most often specified
foreign or multinational companies as their most important competitors
(see Table 2.7) which is natural for large exporters. Comparing the
sample of large exporters with that of all manufacturing companies we
can see that there is no big difference between the two groups' opinion of
their competitors (Figure 2.5). A very important difference is that while
manufacturing companies are both suppliers and competitors of each
other, the business links of the largest exporter are most often and mainly
directed outside of the country and their most important competitors are
not among domestic, but foreign companies. Multinational companies
play a more important role than in manufacturing. That is, multinational
companies influence the market behavior and the decisions of the largest
exporters not only as suppliers and customers, but also as competitors.
We examined the judgment of competitors among the various company
groups, as well. The results indicate that in this regard less significant
differences can be revealed than among manufacturing companies (Tóth
[1998]). From this we can deduce that the group of the largest exporters
is more homogeneous than manufacturing companies are.
Examining the role of competitors as to the closeness of supplier-
customer relationships we can see that the company group which plays
an important role in the business relationships also occupies a
distinguished place among the competitors (see Table 2.8). All these
confirm that the groups of competitors and business partners are not
separate: the members of a company group which has an important part
in the decisions of a company can also be competitors as well as partners
with whom long-term co-operation can be established. By this we not
only mean the collaboration and joint projects of former competitors for
which there have been several examples in business, but also that in the
categorization of the groups of Hungarian companies the competitors and
clients define the same groups, which indicates the definite separation of
the companies.
2.3. Factors of the growth capability
We use two indicators to measure the growth capability of companies:
the first is the growth rate of the net turnover and the second is the
change of the number of employees. (The definition of the variables used
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can be found in Appendix 4.) The analysis was carried out on the basis
of the data of the TOP98/1 and CIPE98A surveys.
Concerning the change of the growth rate we assumed the following. First
we presumed that companies with more stable supplier links could
increase their turnover faster than the average. We can presume more
stable supplier links, on the one hand, where subcontractors commis-
sioned by long-term contracts have an important part in the activities of
the company and, on the other hand, where the breach of payment
discipline by partners is less likely. Thus, we can expect that the
commissioning of subcontractors goes with the better growth possibility
of the given company, and companies which are surrounded by partners
respecting payment discipline are more likely to be able to grow more
significantly.
On the other hand the business links within the company groups also have a
stabilizing effect. This effect must also manifest itself in the growth capability of the
company. Here we can talk about two separate effects. The most foreign-owned
companies, as we had seen earlier, are operating as parts of a holding. And in this
holding the business relations between the Hungarian plant and the foreign
headquarters are very frequent and not insignificant. We are stating, therefore, that
besides having foreign ownership, which in itself has an important effect, those
companies can become more dynamic which can make better use of the advantages
supplied by these networks.
The third assumption concerns another side of business links: we
presume that business links with multinational companies have a favorable
effect on the growth capability of the given company. From among the
largest exporters those companies can reach a better growth rate where in
the turnover the purchases of multinational companies are not
insignificant.
According to the aggregated sales data of the manufacturing industry a
higher increase in the exports was behind the 1997 increase of the
turnover (CSO, [1998]: 187–189). From this we could deduce that the
sales possibilities of companies producing mainly for exports have
improved, that is, at the company level the growth rate of the net turnover
grows simultaneously with the ratio of exports within the net turnover.
This assumption is obviously valid for the groups of exporting and not
exporting companies but is it possible to prove the distinguished role of
exports among the largest exporting companies? We don't think so, as
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from this point of view these companies, as a result of the selection of the
sample, form a more homogeneous group (in 60% of them the ratio of
exports within the net turnover does not exceed 60%) and because of this
in this company group the differences in their foreign and domestic sales
have little effect on the change of the net turnover.
Besides the above, there may be a close relationship between the
dynamics of growth, the financial conditions and effectiveness of the
company. Thus, as fifth, we examine the influence of the companies'
effectiveness. We assume that their growth capability and effectiveness
develop parallel to each other, that is, profitability increases the possibility
for better growth capability. We expect the same regarding the volume of
investments: companies, which are able to increase their investments,
have a better chance for growth. Either because they can make a better
use of their own resources (due to their better financial conditions) or
because they have better access to outside sources.
The models are set up so that beside the control variables at in each case
first we test the effect each explanatory variable has on the subordinate
variable and then we examine the model, which contains all factors.
First let us look at the results of the model estimating the increase of the
net turnover on the basis of the TOP98/1 (See table 2.9.) The estimations
show that it is not irrelevant to presume that the safety of contractual
relations has an effect on the growth capability. This is shown by the fact
that if a company commissioned subcontractors then it is more likely to
be able to get into the group of companies achieving higher growth rate.
However, we could not prove the effect of either the payment discipline
of partners buying from the company or the strong business links with
multinational companies on the growth capabilities of the TOP 1500
companies.
The proportion of exports does not have a part in this either, that is, we
cannot say that a higher ratio of exports in itself would result in faster
growth. With regard to the relationships between the dynamics of the
increase of turnover, the majority ownership of the company and the ratio
of exports we cannot say that exporting companies can increase their
turnover faster but we can state, and the results of the model confirm this,
that the growth dynamics of foreign-owned companies are significantly
better than other companies'. It is only a consequence that the ratio of
exports within the turnover of foreign-owned companies is higher than in
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the case of other companies7.
The better growth capability of foreign companies was confirmed by the
results of all examined models: if the majority owner of a company is
foreign then this fact increases the probability that it will get into the
group of companies achieving better turnover dynamics. For example,
according to the results of Model 5, if in a company group, where none
of the members are foreign-owned 60% of the companies achieve a
growth rate above the median, then in another group, where the
companies only differ from the former in that they are all foreign owned,
the percentage of companies achieving a growth rate above the median is
about 74%.
Furthermore, we can see that being the member of a holding in itself does
not effect the growth capability. However, if companies which are related
by ownership links also establish business links, then the closer business
links make better growth dynamics probable (Model 2). Companies,
which are each others' suppliers within a company group usually, achieve
a faster growth than the rest of the companies. In our opinion this
phenomenon shows that certain business links have a positive influence
on the growth of the company's turnover. Transactional costs resulting
from the instability of business links can be decreased by the
development of ownership links and the establishment of vertically
integrated enterprises (Williamson [1971]). In reaction to the instability of
business links the companies establish hierarchies. This can be done by
signing long-term contracts or if the customer buys its supplier or
establishes a separate unit within its own company or company group
which unit can supply services or manufacture products that were
previously obtained from the market.
We must add that the existence of holdings and the business links within
them are closely related to the presence of foreign ownership. This is also
shown by the fact that in each examined model, together with Model 5
which included the business links, besides the sectoral effects (e.g. the
growth rate of the manufacture of machinery was significantly higher than
in the rest of sectors in manufacturing, which is not really news) only the
effect of foreign ownership seems significant.
                                                
7  In the case of foreign-owned companies this ratio is 69% while in other companies it is
59.8%. The F statistics also show a significant difference between the averages of the two
groups (F=6.89, sign.=0.009).
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The results obtained also confirm the relevancy of assumptions related to
effectiveness and investment activities. It can be considered a positive
sign valid for enterprises having a decisive role in manufacturing that
growth capability is closely related to the effectiveness and investment
activities of the companies (Models 3 and 4). If the latter parameters of a
company were better then it was able to increase its net turnover in 1997
better than the rest of the companies. The fulfillment of this relationship
indicates that economic growth taking place in 1997 is based on
enterprises which are most likely to increase their turnover in the long run
and are more effective than the rest of the companies. According to this,
the significant increase in the manufacturing industry in 1997 has stable
basis and can be considered as the beginning of a tendency, which will be
effective for a longer time, as well.
The models estimating the dynamics of employment (Table 2.10.) on the
one hand repeat the statement concerning the decisive role of foreign
ownership and, on the other hand, show the obvious effect of investment
activities and effectiveness.
The above results can be supplemented by those obtained through the
analysis of the CIPE98A survey (Tóth [1998]). In this, using different
samples, we searched for answers to the same questions as in the sample
of the largest exporters. The two indicators of the growth capability and
the explanatory variables were defined in accordance with those, which
were used previously. The only difference was that the size of the market
range was tested by the use of a variable8.
In each of the models examined we obtained a significant positive
parameter in the case of foreign majority ownership which shows that
foreign ownership had a positive effect so that both in the demand for
labor and in the output the increase these enterprises achieved were
above the median. We can see significant effects in the case of public
(state) owned enterprises but these are negative. The growth capabilities
of these enterprises were significantly lower than those of enterprises with
                                                
8 We distinguished between companies supplying mainly local, regional, domestic and
foreign markets (as to more than 50% of their total sales). By local market we meant the
county in which the headquarters of the given company is and by regional market the
neighboring counties. We considered a company producing for the domestic market if it
supplied mainly Hungarian companies, and producing for foreign markets if most of its
sales were directed abroad. See Tóth [1998].
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similar parameters but under mixed ownership. According to the model
used for the estimation of the number of employees and the variable of
the market range, for example, if the number of employees increases in
70% of the cases within the group of enterprises under mixed ownership,
then for enterprises with foreign owners this proportion is about 86,4%,
while among the public owned companies it is around 33,5%.
We can also see that, besides the above, only two other variables to be
tested seem to have a significant effect. One is the market range, the
other the closeness of the relationship with the multinational companies,
which are buyers. We can state, therefore, that those enterprises which
only sold to local markets (in those towns or counties where their plants
were located) it was significantly less possible to become one of those
enterprises which were able to increase the number of employees. If the
proportion of enterprises which were able to increase the number of
employees was 60% in an enterprise group then about 45,9% are those
within this which sold to regional markets.
On the other hand, the existence of a supplier relationship with
multinational companies somewhat increases the possibility of
employment growth (by 3%). That is, if 60% of those belonging to an
enterprise group which does not supply multinationals can increase their
number of employees, then in the case of enterprises with similar
compositions where more than 20% of the total sales is related to
multinational companies, the proportion of enterprises able to increase the
number of employees is estimated to be around 76%.
In the case of the other factors regarding market links no significant effect
can be seen. This indicates that there is a big difference, a detachment
between Hungarian enterprises selling to local and other type of markets
as well as between those, which supply multinational companies, and
the rest of the enterprises.
The growth prospects, however, are not effected by these factors but by
the type of ownership, namely, whether foreigners, the state or the local
government ownership have significant effect. The first one increases,
the second and third ones decrease the possibility to have a good
business prospect in short-term future. Resulting from the fact the breach
of financial discipline has become a general practice as well as from the
frequency of liquidity problems the growth perspectives are estimated to
be the same for both those which are considered to be "good" in this
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respect and for those which are "bad".
We can draw almost exactly the same conclusions from the estimation of
the change of sales in 1997. The only difference is that besides the above
factors we can include the sectoral effect: in each model firms belonging
to the construction industry were significantly more often among those
achieving a higher growth rate.
3. PERFORMANCE AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE
3.1.  Objectives and methods
Two ways have become widely known in economic literature regarding
the examination of privatization and the impact of ownership structure.
One tries to chronologically follow the changes in the performance of a
company or company group before and after privatization; the other, on
the basis of the yearly data, analyzes the differences between the
performance of companies, which have the same characteristics but dif-
ferent owners. We are fortunate to be able to do both in this study, and
we will also attempt to differentiate between the impact of performance
expected to be achieved in the future and the impact of privatization.
In the following two parts of the analysis we will seek the answer to two
questions:
· how the performance of Hungarian companies changed
between 1992–1996;
· and what differences can be seen between the various
company groups as to their performance?
The classical problem behind both questions is whether the performance
of state-owned, privatized or privately founded companies and their sub-
groups (privately owned domestic and foreign companies) has improved
as a result of privatization. We do not aim to mention here any theories
that related to the micro- and macro-economic effects of privatization.
Their literature could fill a library (for instance Vickers-Yarrow [1988] and
Vuylsteke, Ch. [1989], Attiat–Hartley [1991] and, on East European
privatization, Pinto et al. [1992], [1993]). Actually, we wish to examine
the relationship between two factors: privatization and the performance of
companies. On the basis of the theory we expect that privatization has a
positive effect on the performance of companies - as a matter of fact, this
is one of the rational motives for the decision to privatize (Vickers–
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Yarrow [1991]). We must assume that the efficiency of a company will
improve after privatization. To empirically test this it would be enough to
look at the difference between the performance of privatized companies
and other state-owned companies. By doing this, however, we would be
making a mistake as the results of the analysis would include the
prerequisites of the process (petitio principii): we would be using as
evidence what we wanted to prove. Privatization decisions (when to
privatize which company and how to do it), as a matter of fact, are not
independent of the present (observed) and prospective (expected)
performance of the given company. That is, it is possible that the
parameters of the privatized companies' performance seem to be
significantly better only because companies which were originally better
or had better performance prospective were privatized at the same time.
The rest of the state-owned companies stayed under state ownership or
closed down. In this case, instead of relationships believed to be relevant,
we only obtain artificial relationships. That is, it is not as simple as it
looks.
If we want to describe it using models, then we must differentiate
between two effects. The first is when privatization (the change of the
ownership structure of a company) influences the company's
performance. Let us call this the privatization effect. And the other is
when a company's present of potential performance has an influence on
whether or not the company will be privatized at a later date. Let us call
this the performance effect. If the time factor is also included in the
model then the performance effect is supplemented by a third effect, that
is, when the performance achieved by an enterprise at a given time
influences its performance achieved at a later time. (All these are shown in
Figure 3.1.) That is, the performance of a company at time t1 can be
influenced by their performance at time t0 and the fact whether they were
privatized at time t0. One of the aims of our analysis is to determine and
differentiate between these two effects.
However, it is not certain that it is the years before and after privatization
that should be compared in order to study the effects of privatization.
There are two reasons for this. According to one of them, during the
preparation of privatization the management and the government started
restructuring companies and this fact, while increasing the odds for
privatization (making the company more attractive), improved the
performance indices, as well. As a result, the companies' performance
and efficiency started to improve before privatization. This effect was the
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aim of governmental reorganization programs in Hungary before the
privatization. The other reason is related to the short period after
privatization (1–2 years). During this period, instability due to the change
of ownership (and because of this the postponement of investments) and
reorganizations after privatization resulted in the short-term decrease in
the performance and efficiency of the companies.
We must mention two more difficulties regarding the observation of the
problem in question. One is related to the cross-section analysis, the
other to the chronological analysis. When comparing the performance of
state and privately owned companies, the justification of indices
measuring profitability is questionable. Accepting the fact that the
objective functions of state-owned and private companies are different, in
the case of the former it is welfare maximization, while for the latter it is
profit maximization (Vickers–Yarrow, [1988]), we obtain trivial results by
showing the better profitability of private companies.
On the other hand, the difficulty of the chronological comparison lies in
the fact that the economic-political conditions of the companies are not
constant in a given period. The change of the macro-economic
environment and the waves of regulation and deregulation influence the
performance of the companies. There are examples in literature where, if
the degree of economic regulation has a strong influence on the economic
performance of companies and the effect of ownership on performance
can be neglected (Douglas et al. [1982]).
In the followings we will examine five years' data using a sample of
Hungarian enterprises belonging to the competitive sector (the description
of the database used and the definition of the variables can be found in
the Appendices). The change of four parameters indicating the
performance and profitability of companies will be followed
chronologically and using cross-section analysis. These are the following:
C_S = Cash-flow/number of employees
C_T = Cash-flow/tangible assets
C_N = Cash-flow/net turnover
V_S = Value added/number of employees
The companies are grouped according to the following variables:
L = Staff categories of employees
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S = Sectors
OWGR = Type of majority owner
GFIRM = Position of the company within the sample (e.g. is it
included in the database for every year).
First we will discuss how the variables change with time and then for each
year we will examine their parameters in each company group, with the
help of variance analysis. Here the impact of privatization can only be
measured indirectly as in Hungary and in East-Central European countries
in general, privatization took place along with the structural-legal
transformation of companies and in most cases it cannot be separated
from the latter. As the structural-legal transformation affects the statistical
registration of the companies, the pre- and post-privatization history of
the companies cannot be traced by an analysis in which companies can
be distinguished on the basis of their statistical identification (or their tax-
file number). Such is the present analysis. Thus, it is impossible to
systematically observe the impact of privatization or structural-legal
change, or to separate these.
From the sample including the analyzed companies it is possible,
however, to select a group that was apparent in every analyzed year. This
panel data set enables us to examine a part of the privatization that took
place between 1992–1996. By this we mean the ownership change of
companies where the corporatisation of state-owned companies, that is,
the structural-legal transformation took place before 1992 in such a way
that the companies stayed under the ownership of the state and their
privatization only took place after 1992. For the analysis we have
established a variable (PRIV) the value of which is 1 if the company's
majority owner in 1992 is still the state but by 1996 it became mostly
privately owned; and 0 if it was still state-owned. First we estimate the
odds for privatization in a logistic regression model, then this variable and
the 1992, 1993 and 1994 parameters of the examined variables of
company performance are included in a model which shows the
performance in 1996.
Our hypothesis regarding the analysis is that privatization has a positive
effect on the performance of the companies. That is, we expect a positive
coefficient for the variable PRIV. Together with this, the effect of
performance in the years prior to 1996 is estimated to be insignificant.
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3.2.  Tendencies and company groups
During the economic transformation between 1992–1996 the Hungarian
economy went through its worst crisis since World War II. This can be
well seen from the company-level data we examined. As compared to
1992, in 1993 the free resources of the companies decreased significantly.
This is shown by the radical change of the cash flow to assets and the
cash-flow to employment.
It can also be seen from the data that, after the plunge of 1993, in the
following years the profitability of the companies gradually improved.
While in 1993 in 20.3% of the companies the cash flow was not positive,
in 1996 this was only true in 10.7% of them (Table 3.1). The comparison
of the position of the companies in the successive years according to
their cash-flow shows that the profitability of the companies gradually
improved (see Table 3.2). That is, following the transformational
recession, from 1994 the financial situation of the companies started to
become stable, improved, and the resulting economic growth can be seen
in the macro-economic data of 1997. This growth is well founded and
seems to be permanent; this is indicated by previously published results
of our surveys and it is confirmed by the following calculations, as well.
In the followings we will examine the changes of the Hungarian com-pany
sector between 1992–1996 according to various categories of com-
panies as to area, sector, size and type of majority owner. Almost every
one of these considerations indicate that, similarly to the period between
1998–1991, radical changes took place in the Hungarian economy at the
company level between 1992–1996, as well (see Tables 3.3–3.9).
The composition of companies within a sector has changed somewhat
during this period: the number of those in food processing has increased
while that in construction decreased. This is related to the significant
relapse in construction industry and construction projects.
Observing the regional ratios three tendencies can be seen: relapse in the
central region, growth in the Transdanubian region, and a decreasing role
of the eastern regions. This phenomenon can be seen not only in the
change in the number of companies but it is also shown by the role
companies of the various regions play in the production of value-added
cash and in the cash-flow. Both indices show that the eastern regions of
the country are lagging behind.
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The decline of the industries in and around Budapest during the
economic transition was compensated for by the increase of the role of
services in this region, but the tendencies characteristic of the eastern and
western part of the country are characteristic of all branches of industry.
According to this, economic transformation goes on in Hungary in such a
way that at the same time it increases the differences between the western
region that has better infrastructure and labor conditions and the
underdeveloped eastern region.
The composition of companies as to size changed in such a way that the
proportion of smaller firms (with 21–50 employees) increased, while that
of the larger (over 300 employees) decreased. This tendency, however, is
only partly reflected by the performance of the companies: within the
value added the weight of smaller companies decreased significantly
(from 22% to 12,6%) and that of medium-size companies increased
(from 15,9% to 22,9%), while in those with over 300 employees it hardly
changed at all. This could result from the natural growth of the firms
(when the small firms that were capable of growth joined those with more
employees) and also from the improved performance of firms that were
originally considered as average. The economic recession of 1992–1993
affected the smaller firms (21–50 employees) above all; their profitability
decreased the most. While in 1992 35,4% of the cash-flow of the
examined companies came from small firms, in 1996 only 13,7% of the
total cash-flow.
Ownership changes, as we've already mentioned, are closely related to
the change of the legal form of companies in Hungary. The proportion of
state-owned enterprises has decreased to a small fraction during this
period (from 8,9% to 0,2%). The same tendency is characteristic of the
co-operatives, too: their proportion has decreased to 9,7% from 17,5%.
At the same time, the proportion of LTD’s increased significantly (from
60% to 73,5%).
These tendencies were followed by the changes in the majority owners of
the firms: the proportion of mainly state-owned firms decreased (from
22% to 3,6%) which was accompanied by the significant growth in the
proportion of foreign-owned and Hungarian privately owned firms (the
former increased from 9,4% to 19,4% while the latter from 44% to 52%).
The influence of the radical ownership change could be observed in the
proportion of the value added, as well. While in 1992 36,5% of the value
added were supplied by state-owned enterprises, in 1996 this was only
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4,6%: the contribution of foreign-owned firms to the value added
increased from the 20% of 1992 to 50% in 1996. The roles of the various
company groups within the total cash flow do not indicate anything else,
either. The decrease of state ownership was accompanied by the increase
of private ownership, especially foreign ownership. In 1992 23,6% of the
total cash flow belonged to foreign firms while in 1996 58,7%. This also
shows that the profitability of foreign firms improved better than the
average between 1992–1996.
In accordance with this, in 1996 the Hungarian economy is
characterized by foreign ownership on the one hand, and private
ownership, on the other hand. Theories stressing the diffuse ownership
structure (Szelényi et al. [1996]) and the dominance of recombinant
property (Stark [1996] and Bruszt–Stark [1996]) have no relevance.
The simple comparison of the data supplies another important
conclusion. According to this, in the company structure characteristic
after 1996 those firms have a decisive role, which were established in the
first part of the transition, in or before 1992. More than 40% of the
companies operating in 1996 already existed in 1992. This means, on the
one hand, that we can confirm the statement according to which the first
part of the transition (which started in 1988) ended by 1992 the outlines
of the company structure determining the subsequent developments had
been more or less established (Köllõ [1996], [1998]). On the other hand,
it can be stated that significant changes took place in the period between
1993–1996, 40% of the companies operating in 1996 were formed during
those years.
We can also state that the economic performance of the firms in the panel
sub-sample (those operating during the whole period between 1992–
1996) are significantly better than what can be deduced from their
proportion within the sample. Almost 60% of the value added produced
by the firms included in the sample was supplied by firms belonging to
this stable group, (noyou dur) between 1992–1996.
3.3.  Performance of the firms between 1992–1996
If we wish to examine whether in the various groups of enterprises there
are systematic differences between the values of indicators we examined
which show the performance of the enterprises and if we wish to give an
answer as to whether within the Hungarian entrepreneurial sector there are
31
well separable sub-groups as to these parameters, then we must
distinguish between the various effects.
This can be done through variance analyses where the dependent
variables are the indicators of company performance, while the
explanatory or independent variables show the company's sector, size,
and type of majority ownership as well as its position within the sample.
The models were calculated for each year. According to the results of
models explaining the relationship of the cash flow with the net turnover,
the number of employees and the total assets, the year 1992 is considered
special as compared to the rest. It could be observed that at that time the
indicators of the smaller firms (with 21–50 employees) are a lot more
favorable than those of the other companies. Furthermore, compared to
firms with mixed ownership, all other ownership groups have significantly
worse indicators.
First let us look at models estimating cash flow with regard to the net
turnover. During the years 1993–1995 the differences as to the company
size are smaller, sometimes insignificant. But the parameters of the
smallest firms always show the favorable position of this company group
with regard to performance. Then in 1996 we can again notice an increase
in the differences regarding size. The effect of company size does not
change: with increasing company size the proportionate value of the cash
flow as to the net turnover decreases.
Parameters belonging to the other factor important from the aspect of our
topic, the type of majority owner, indicate that between 1992–1996 the
coefficients of public ownership (OWGR=1) are always negative while
the circle of companies belonging here, as we could see earlier, has
significantly narrowed down. That is, the results confirm that part of the
hypothesis described in 3.1. where we assumed an essential difference
within the competitive sector between state and private ownership.
However, looking at the various groups under private ownership
(Hungarian individual, domestic firm, foreign), we can see that it is not
private ownership itself, which is the differentiating factor. The
coefficients of Hungarian individuals and domestic companies are always
smaller than those of state-owned properties, but they are negative and,
except for 1993, significant at the 5% level, while the coefficients of
foreign majority ownership are always positive after 1993. This means
that we are not talking simply of the temporary good influence of the
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transition from state-ownership to private ownership but we can
emphasize a certain type of private ownership, that is, foreign ownership,
which significantly improves the performance of the companies. This
effect can be observed in every year between 1993–1996.
The parameters which belong to the various categories of variables
showing the appearance of the companies in the sample (GFIRM)
indicate that after 1993 the performance of newly formed companies or
firms belonging to the stable group are significantly better than that of
companies closing down or those which only appeared in the sample in
one year. Companies belonging to the stable group had a positive
coefficient in 1993 (significant at the 10% level), and those, which were
closing down, had negative coefficients. According to this, after 1993 the
yearly changing of the companies happened in such a way that the weaker
companies were usually replaced by those achieving better performance
parameters. This can happen through the natural replacement of the
companies, or another way of doing it is when a company group
rearranges its loss-making activities to one of its companies (which goes
bankrupt later on) and the company group which was "cleaned" can thus
produce more favorable parameters.
If the cash flow is compared to the number of employees instead of the
net turnover, then the results obtained are similar to the above. In the case
of size we can see that small companies are in a somewhat more
favorable position and, considering the majority ownership, in each year
between 1992 and 1996 cash-flow to staff numbers is estimated to be the
highest in the case of foreign-owned companies, while it was considered
to be the lowest for those still under public ownership. Companies, which
belonged to the stable group, had positive coefficients between 1992–
1993. And, between 1994–1996, the value of cash flow to staff numbers
is the highest in the case of new companies. In the case of cash-flow to
total assets, company size seems to have a reverse effect which is natural
as the total assets of companies with more employees are always
relatively higher. This effect, on the one hand, explains the negative
coefficients related to foreign ownership (foreign-owned companies
usually have higher capital and, thus, more assets) and the positive effects
related to Hungarian private ownership (individuals and domestic
companies). After 1992, however, neither the effects related to foreign
ownership nor those related to Hungarian private ownership are
significant at any level.
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When examining the variance of the value added to employment, we can
observe the same phenomena. A significant difference can be seen in the
effect of company size. The analysis of the variance of the value added
to employment shows a positive effect of foreign majority ownership:
these companies produced the highest specific value added in each
year. And, just like before, public ownership has negative coefficients in
every year. According to the model, firms belonging to the stable group
as well as the new ones have the most favorable performance parameters
in every year. The effect of company size changed during the years: in
1992–1994 the value added to employment is estimated to be the highest
among smaller companies but by 1995–1996 no significant difference can
be seen between the companies with regard to this. That is, we can say
that the contribution of companies to the total value added is
proportionate to their number of employees. If it stays the same after
1996, then we can well estimate the proportion of value added produced
by each company group as to the total value added, using the proportion
of the number of employees within the given company group as to the
total number of employees.
On the basis of the above, three facts can characterize company
performance between 1992–1996: (1) each aspect of categorization we
chose lists the Hungarian enterprises into groups with significantly
different characteristics9; (2) smaller and mainly foreign-owned
companies have relatively favorable performance parameters since 1993;
(3) the performance of new companies is more favorable than in the case
of those closing down, that is, the fluctuation of the enterprises is
accompanied by the increase of the weight of companies that are more
profitable and produce specifically more value added.
3.4. Privatization and performance effect
In the followings we will shortly deal with the examination of the clear
effect of privatization. For this purpose we selected a stable group for the
above analyzed sample (companies included in the panel) and within
these, corporations which were owned by the state in 1992 and using
                                                
9 The statistics in the 1994 model of assets as to the cash-flow are insignificant only in the
case of GFIRM. The situation is the same in the case of size in the variance of the 1996
value added.
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these we tested the effect of two factors. The sample to be analyzed
included 454 companies, 15,2% of which were privatized between 1993–
1996. First we examined whether there was a relationship between
privatization and the 1992 performance and profitability of the company.
For this we used the following logistic regression model:
Prob (PRIV=1) = f (S93, L93, V_S92, C_S92)
where
PRIV: the indicator of privatization, the value of which is 1 if
the company went from state-owned to being privately owned
between 1993–1996, otherwise it is 0;
S: sectors:
L: staff categories
V_S92:value added to employment in 1992
C_S92: cash flow to employment in 1992
If the indicators measuring performance have a significant and positive
effect in the model then we can confirm the statement that the initial
performance of the company had an effect on the odds for privatization.
If not, then the assumption related to the independence of these two
factors is probably more relevant.
The other model included the completion of privatization and the
parameters of the relative performance in the year 1993. Here the
dependent variable is not the company's performance but, to avoid all
effects influencing the performance of all of the companies every year, it
is the position the company occupies within the sample on the basis of its
performance. It is measured by the ratio of the companies' performance
as to the average performance characterizing the whole sample:
PERFR96i = f (L, S, PRIV, OWGR, GRIRM, PERFR93i)
Where
PERFR96i = C_N96i /C_N96a or V_S96i / V_S96a
PERFR93i = C_N93i /C_N93a or V_S93i / V_S93a
C_Ni = the cash-flow to employment of company i
V_Si = the value-added to employment of company i
C_Na = the average cash-flow to net turnover characterizing the
sample
V_Sa = the average value-added to employment characterizing the
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sample.
If the effect of PRIV appears to be significant and positive in the model
than using this narrowed-down sample we can confirm the performance
increasing effect of privatization taking place between 1993–1996. If not,
then the question must be considered unanswered, due to two reasons: a)
we cannot directly measure the effect of privatization taking place
between 1988–1992. This may be seen from the relatively better
performance in the panel sub-sample but here we cannot separate the
effects of privatization and the effect of performance. b) We still cannot
observe the effects of privatization, which took place simultaneously with
the change of the legal form.
On the other hand, if the effect of the previous performance is significant
and positive then we can state that performance before and during
privatization does have an effect on the present performance of the
company. Business positions of several years before can effect the
performance and future development possibilities of companies for a
long time.
Results of the first model indicate (see table A7) that the better
performance of a company (value added to employment) has a positive
effect on the odds for privatization and it is a negative for the relative
proportion of the cash flow of a company. But all those effects are not
significant. Furthermore, company size has a significant effect; the odds
for the privatization of smaller (20–100 employees) state-owned
companies were better than for larger ones.
We suspect the relatively strong bargaining position of the management
of companies to be privatized to be behind the opposite effects of the
performance indicators. This is confirmed by the examination of the
institutional conditions of Hungarian privatization and its success
(Fogarassy [1996], Fogarassy–Szántó [1996]) for which the necessary
pre-condition was the strong bargaining position of the management as
opposed to the creditor banks and governmental institutions. Being in a
stronger position, the management took advantage of this, which resulted
in privatization (in which the management participated directly or through
their companies on the customers' side) or in the fact that they could
determine salaries more independently than in other state-owned
companies. These were able to cut out a specifically larger part of the
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company’s profit for themselves and their employees in the form of
salaries, than the management of state-owned companies which were
under closer state control and in weaker bargaining positions.
The effect of company size can also be related to this factor: it was easier
for the management of smaller companies to take the initiative into their
own hands. (For instance the smaller state-owned companies were not
even included in the 1994 records of the State Property Agency.)
In the second model (See A8.) we estimated the cash flow to
employment positions of the companies in 1996. The results show that it
is positively effected both by privatization and the 1993 positions of the
companies as to their cash flow. According to this, after privatization the
management’s and the new owners’ behavior changed with regard to
payroll expenses, they tried to minimize expenses related to salaries.
The third model (See A8), where we estimated the positions according to
value added to employment, shows that besides the 1993 position of
performance the effect of privatization is not significant. According to
this, the contributions to the value added do not show a positive effect of
privatization. At the same time, it is true that (as we could see from the
first model) those companies were privatized between 1993–1996 where
the performance was better according to this indicator, too. Therefore,
the better performance of privatized companies measured by the value
added to employment in 1996 is not the result of privatization, but other
technological, organizational influences or business conditions, which
were in effect even before privatization.
4. CONCLUSIONS
On the basis of our analyses the following factors can characterize the
business condition of Hungarian enterprises in 1997–1998 and the growth
started in 1997 in the Hungarian economy:
· a stable company structure developed by 1996
· the holding structure has appeared but its role is not dominant
· the Hungarian private ownership and foreign ownership are
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dominant in the ownership structure of the Hungarian economy
· the concentration of the ownership structure
· the improvement of market conditions (e.g. increase in the time
horizont of planning)
· the weakness of financial discipline
· the decisive role and the best performance indicators of foreign-
owned companies
· concentration
· polarization
· limited growth
· stability of growth
· and better prospects of growth.
On the basis of the results of the analysis we can state that by the second
half of the 90's a company structure has developed which will determine
the development of the Hungarian economy for a long time. In this
structure those companies have a dominant role, which were established
in the first part of the economic transition (between 1988–1992). Their
contribution to the production of value added is about 60% of the total
value added.
On the other hand, companies, which are mainly foreign-owned, have a
decisive role in this structure. Their specific profitability and value added
production parameters; growth capabilities are the best among Hungarian
enterprises. We can reach this conclusion not only through the analysis of
the tax returns of 1993–1996 but also on the basis of the analysis of the
latest (1997–1998) surveys.
The dominant role of foreign ownership appears in several areas. On the
one hand, business links between these companies and other enterprises
within the company groups are a lot closer. This fact in itself ensures
more balanced business links, which, according to our calculations, has a
positive effect on the growth capability of a firm. This is indicated,
among others, by the significantly better payment discipline of the
business partners. Furthermore, foreign ownership in itself increases the
probability for the given company to grow faster.
The analysis of both the facts of 1997 and the intentions for 1998 show
that companies with foreign ownership have a good effect on the
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investment capability of the Hungarian economy. From our analyzes we
could see that these have significantly better indicators than the rest of the
companies regarding both the total turnover and within this the growth of
exports, as well as the intentions to increase the number of employees
and the turnover. In the following the question is how the products and
the labor-demand of enterprises producing mainly for local and domestic
markets will develop in the near future and how well these can become
linked (as suppliers) to groups of companies which are under better
conditions and able to grow faster.
Concentrated growth means that not only the production and the turnover
is centralized in the hands of a few large companies, as it had been
indicated by previous empirical examinations and the CSO data, but the
increase of the turnover, as well. A few companies with majority foreign
ownership, which are mainly producing for foreign markets, were
responsible for most of the growth in 1997.
Beyond this it can be observed that the change of the economic
circumstances increases the differences between the companies and the
company groups regarding their chances for future growth. Those who
were able to grow earlier (those who increased their output, were able to
invest, or increased their number of employees) have better chances for
growth than those who were unable to expand in the initial stage of
economic change. From this aspect groups of small and medium-size
companies with a majority of Hungarian private ownership have less
chance to increase their output than larger foreign-owned companies and,
accordingly, their short-term growth prospects are a lot less favorable.
But concentration does not mean that growth is unstable. Instability
would mean that growth would come to a standstill if the business
strategies or sales prospects of some companies of central position
would change unfavorably. This is very unlikely as companies which are
the motors of growth not only have been supplying the decisive
proportion of manufacturing products or exports for years, but in the last
two-three years they have been growing steadily at a rate characteristic of
most of the companies. On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that
almost half of the companies observed, as in 1996, were able to increase
the real value of their turnover in 1997, almost 40% of them invested over
the value of 100 million HUF, and almost 60% of them expect an increase
in their orders in the first half of 1998.
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Another proof of the stability is that, as compared to 1994, within the
largest exporting companies the proportion of firms, which can plan for a
longer period, has increased significantly. This can be a proxy to the
moderation of risks related to investments and the increase of turnover.
Finally, polarization or the limits of economic development does not
mean that, on the basis of the intentions of 1998, we could observe the
occurrence of tendencies opposite to these. The analysis of the
prospects of the first half of 1998 shows that the expansion of the
turnover in 1998, which is probably less than a year before, will effect the
companies more equally than a year before. It is conceivable, that this will
be observed in a company segment which produces more new products
as compared to its output than multinational companies considered to be
the motors of the 1997 growth of the turnover. A more balanced growth
can take place as a result of the further improvement of general
economical conditions (among these the reduction of inflation and the
level of interest, as well as the predictability of their tendencies are
decisive) or through the growth in the demand of companies related by
supplier-buyer links, but psychological factors could also play a role in
this. The expectations of smaller Hungarian-owned companies, which are
not really influenced by the economical changes, are positively effected
by the growth in process. And the more favorable prospects of these
enterprises can promote such economical decisions as a result of which
the demand of these companies will increase, that is, the rate of
economical growth can also increase.
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